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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
-v-
ISADORE BLEA, 
Respondent, 
Appellant. 
Case 
No. 10754 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
The appellant, Isadore Blea, appeals from a con-
viction on jury trial for the crime of fraudulently ob-
taining a narcotic drug. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was charged in the Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, with fraud-
ulently obtaining a narcotic drug by use of a false 
name. On August 15, 1966, appellant was found 
guilty of said charge and sentenced by the Hon-
orable Leonard W. Elton to a term in the Utah State 
Prison of not to exceed five (5) years. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent submits that the decision of the 
tricil court shculd be dfJrrned. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about December 15, 1965, appellant enter-
ed the offices of Dr. Maitland G. Spencer, M. D. and 
represented himself to the receptionist as being 
Frank Rivera (T. 17). The receptionist ushered appel-
lant into an examing room to await the doctor. 
Appellant had previously used the name "Frank 
Rivera" in an earlier visit to Dr. Spencer on or about 
'November 15, 1965 (T. 32). Appellant again repre-
sented himself to Dr. Spencer as being Frank Rivera, 
and complained that he and his entire family were 
ill and in need of medication for diarrhea (T. 24, 26). 
As a result of that conversation, Dr. Spencer gave 
appella_nt a prescription for deodorized tincture of 
opium (T. 26). 
Appellant Blea then took this prescription to 
th8 'N estside Drug Store, 880 West 2nd South, Salt 
Lake City, Utah and presented it to the pharmacist 
on duty for filling. The prescription form bore the 
name Frank Rivera and appellant Blea represented 
himself to be Frank Rivera to the pharmacist (T. 33). 
Pursuant to this prescription the pharmacist filled a 
bottle 1.~1ith three o:mr:-es o[ deodorized tincture of 
opium 0nd gc1ve lt to apoellnnt. There is no issue that 
deodorized tinct1ir8 of opium i::; rt narcotic under 
Ut-=ih law. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
- THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY ADVISED THE 
TRIER OF FACT AS TD THE NE CE SS '\HY ELEMENT~ 
OF THE CRIME OF OBTAINING A NARCOTIC DRUC 
BY THE USE OF A FALSE NAME. 
Appellant in his brief contends that Instruction 
No. 8 (R. 9) is incomplete in failing to list two addit-
ional items as necessary elements to find a violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 58-13a-35 (1963). The instruction 
as given is set out on page 5 of appellant's brief. 
Appellant contends that there must additionally be 
shown: (1) an intent to obtain a narcotic drug by use 
of the false name or knowledge that the drug so ob-
t.=i.ined was in fact a narcotic, and f2) a reliance by the 
doctor or pharmacist prescribing a drug or filling a 
prescription on the false name given. 
Respondent would answer these contentions by 
stating that the trial court gave a complete instruct-
ion as to the mental element required to convict in 
Instruction No. 9 (R. 10) wherein it said: 
You are instructed that in every crime or public of-
fense there must be :J uni.on or joint operation of act 
and intent. The intent or intenhon is rnanifested by 
the circumst:mces connected with the offense and 
the sound mind and discretion of the accuse<1. 
The only intent required is that of giving a false 
name. There is no question that appellant knowling-
1 y used the name "Frank Rivera" in all his dealings 
with the physician and the pharmacist. 
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Appellant makes mention of a line of state cases 
dealing with unlawful possession of a narcotic. Res-
pondent submits that these cases are in point in this 
·matter since appellant knowlingly used a false 
name, "Frank Rivera," when he obtained the pre-
scription from Dr. Spencer and obtained the narcotic 
itself from the pharmacist. There is no claim that 
appellant did not intend to use the false name; no 
claim is made that the doctor or the pharmacist mis-
understood the name appellant gave to them. Both 
recalled the name to be "Frank Rivera;" not too 
close in sound to ''Isadore Blea.'' 
A case cited by appellant is most expletive. 
Beasley v. State, 158 Fla. 824, 30 So.2d 379 (1947) was 
an action for uttering a forged prescription for nar-
cotic drugs. The court stated at 30 So.2d 380 that in 
order to prove the offense, it must be alleged and 
shown that: (a) the instrument was forged; (b) that 
the defendant knew the instrument was false and 
forged and (c) that it was uttered with an intent to 
injure or defraud another. 
Here this criteria is met. (1) Appellant Blea used 
the false name Frank Rivera; (2) Blea knew that this 
was a false name; (3) Blea gave the false name with 
the intent to defraud both the doctor and the pharm-
acist 
For his second element, appellant urges an 
instruction that the jury must find that there was in 
fad a reliance on the false name given as an induce-
ment to the procurement of a narcotic drug. To sup-
port this contention, he cites the case of State v. 
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Powell, 212 Ore. 684, 321 P.2d 333 (1958). Respond-
ent submits this case can in no way be used to sup-
port that principal. In the Powell case, the Oregon 
Supreme Court was required to construe two stat-
utes dealing with using false names in obtaining nar-
cotics. One was nearly identical to the Utah statute 
here in question.1 The second made it a misdemean-
or to "use a false name or give a false address in 
obtaining treatment in the course of which narcotic 
drugs are prescribed or dispensed."2 
The court stated that it was required by the 
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment that the same acts must be as to all persons 
treated either as a felony or as a misdemeanor; not 
as both. Therefore, it was unconstitutional to charge 
the same act two ways, and since defendant had ob-
tained treatment illegally, the cause was remanded 
for sentencing pursuant to the misdemeanor charge. 
It is submitted that Powell cannot be authority 
for the proposition that reliance by the physician is 
a necessary element since the Oregon court was 
dealing with constitutional issues as well as attempt-
ing to interpret two separate statutes. This distinction 
was later pointed out in a case directly supporting 
respondent's theory of reliance not being a neces-
1. Ore. Rev. Stat. 474.170 "(l) No person shall obtain or attempt to obtain 
a narcotic drug, or procure the administration of a narcotic drug: "(d) 
By the use of a false name or the giving of a false address." And Ore. 
Rev. Stat. 474.990 reads as follows: "Any person violating any provision 
of this chapter shall: "(l) Upon conviction, be punished _by a fine not 
exceeding $5000.00 by imprisonment in the state penitentiary for not ex· 
ceeding 10 years, or both." 
2. Ore. Rev. State. 475.060 
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sary element. 
State v. Lee, 62 Wash. 2d 228, 382 P.2d 491 (1963) 
presented this issue solely. Defendant complained 
of severe pain to a physician and requested medi-
cation; the physician prescribed a narcotic. It is ad-
mitted that in so doing defendant was using a false 
name. Defendant then took the prescription to an 
adjacent pharmacist, again using the same false 
name. He then asked the pharmacist to request the 
doctor to prescribe a different drug because the one 
prescribed made defendant ill. Another narcotic was 
substituted and the prescription filled. 
The Washington State Supreme Court made a. 
thorough review of its state's codification of the Uni-
form Narcotic Drug Act and cited other jurisdictions' 
approaches to the question of actual reliance as an 
element of fraudulently obtaining a narcotic drug by 
the use of a false name. Respondent would direct 
this court's attention to the three cases discussed 
therein: People v. Oviedo, 106 C.A.2d 690, 235 P.2d 
612 (1951); State v. Newstead, Mo. _______ , 280 
S.W.2d 6 (1955); and Geurin v. Nevada, 73 Nev. L'.33, 
315 P.2d 965 0957). 
The Court in discussing the bask purpose of 
enacting a statute identical to that of Utah, said at 
382 P.2d 494: 
The legislative purpose, in enacting the Uniform 
Narcotic Drug Act, was to curh illrgnl traffic in nar-
cotic drugs, and to regulate and control their sale 
and distribution. The section here in question. when 
read in conjunction with the recording provisions of 
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the act, is directed at a particular aspect of this gen-
crn 1 purpose, nmnely, to prevent a person with a 
seemin,~ly legitimate complaint from obtaining an 
oversupply of narcotic drugs by using a different 
1w.r:1e and address in any number of physicians' of-
fices and/or pharmacies. To curtail such excessive 
use and the unlav:ful obtaining of narcotic drugs is 
well \Vithin the proper exercise of the police power 
of the state. 
The court concluded that in enacting such a pro-
vision: 
The legislature did not intend that proof of reliance 
upon a false na~w and I or address by the doctor or 
pharmacist should be an element of the offense. 
POINT 2 
T'HERE \VAS AMPLE DIHECT TESTIMONY THAT 
"ISADORE BLEA" WAS IN FACT THE DEFENDANT'S 
NAME. 
In his second assignment of error, appellant at-
tempts to convince this court that the trier of fact had 
no testimony or informaion that "Blea" was in fact 
this defendant's name. Respondent would say only 
that defendant was addressed as Blea by the trial 
judge, by both counsel, and by all witnesses who 
identified him. To be more specific, the state's 
chief narcotic investigator identified defendant as 
Isadore Blea and stated that he had known Blea pre-
viously: 
Q. Now, are you acquainted with an individ-
ual known as Isadore Blea? 
A. Yes, sir. 
O. Do you see him in the Courtroom? 
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A. Yes, Sir. 
Q. Would you point him out, please? 
A. Mr. Blea is sitting over there. 
Q. You had a conversation with Mr. Blea? 
A. Yes. 
Q. On more than one occassion? 
A. Yes. (T. 45). 
Counsel for the defendant referred to his client 
as Blea IT. 48). Both Dr. Spencer and the pharmacist 
identified the defendant as Blea (T. 24, 34). The res-
pondent submits that the trier of fact had more than 
sufficient direct testimony to identify the defendant 
as Isadore Blea. 
POINT 3 
THERE WAS NO ERROR AT TRIAL COURT TO 
REQUIRE REMAND FOR NEW TRIAL. 
For his third point on appeal, appellant cites 
numerous cases to the effect that instrucions not ob-
jected to at trial cannot be reviewed on appeal un-
less there was such an extreme misstatement of law 
as to deprive a defendant of a fair trial. Again re-
spondent takes no issue with this statement of law. 
However, appellant has completely failed to show 
any instance wherein the instructions given in this 
case were in fact erroneous. 
Instruction No. 8 (R. 9) gives the elements of the 
::Mense charged: 
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1. That on or about the 15th day of December, 
1965, that said defendant obtained a narcotic 
drug known as Deodorized Tincture of Opium; 
2. That Deodorized Tintcnre of Opium is a narcotic 
drug within the meaning of the laws of the State 
of Utah; 
3. That said defendant obtained said narcotic drug 
by the use of a false name; 
4. That the acts took place within the confines of 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
Appellant has attempted to show a further re-
quirement of actual reliance by the doctor on the 
false name given as a basis for issuing the prescript-
ion or that were it not for the false name, the doctor · 
would not have issued it. Respondent has shown 
this requirement to be falacious. The law requires 
the state to show only that which it did: 1. That the 
defendant obtained a narcotic drug. 2. That the de-
fendant obtained said narcotic drug by the use of a 
false name. 3. That the act occurred in the state of 
Utah. The necessary intent required on the part of 
the defendant was shown by his voluntary use of 
the false name Frank Rivera. Instruction No. 9 gives 
the statutory requirement of intent taken from Utah 
Code Ann.§ 76-1-20 (1953). 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent submits that the trial court correctly 
instructed the trier of fact as to the requirements for 
a conviction for the crime of illegally obtaining a 
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narcotic drug by use of a false name. Appellant has 
wholly failed to show any error committed at trial 
and herefore this court must affirm the conviction of 
the defendant. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
LEROY S. AXLAND 
Assistant Attorney General 
State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondent 
